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1. Introduction  
The European Monetary Union was a political project. The uncertainty factors involved were disregarded, even though 
many economists, especially in the USA, warned of the risks. Unfortunately, those words of caution have come true. 
The EuroThinkTank of Finland, a working group representing economists, experienced professionals in the financial 
sector and a statistician took it upon itself to analyse the underlying reasons of the economic and political crisis afflicting the 
eurozone and to assess the future of the euro. Of special interest to the group was to examine the options available to 
Finland, a small euro member. The think tank members were united by a sense of disappointment with the economic 
development of the eurozone, the rhetoric nature of the policy on the euro and the lack of diversity in the argumentation 
related to the assessment of its performance. 
The report raised the following questions: 
 
(i)  Why is the eurozone in crisis? What is the magnitude of the welfare losses the crisis has led to? 
(ii)  Do the political union, banking union and fiscal union represent solutions that promote democracy, economic efficiency 
and the general welfare and security of the citizens?  
(iii) Is a full-blown federation a better option than the current trend towards a weak federal state, or are we heading for the 
re-adoption of national currencies? 
(iv)  What are the options available for Finland?  
 
The think tank held that the foreseen political union including the banking union and fiscal union will push the eurozone 
towards a sort of practical federal state, referred to as the 'weak federation'. It has also transpired that conflicts of interest 
between individual member states cannot be overlooked in the assessment of the future evolution of the eurozone. States 
facing a sovereign debt crisis demand that their problems be resolved through solidarity, while member states that have put in 
a better performance in looking after their public finances object to joint liability.  
The report conveyed a message to Finland's political decision makers: Finland has a range of options, including the 
current 'driftwood option', a unilateral return to the Maastricht Treary (Maastricht 2.0) with an option to abstain from a further 
step of integration, and Fixit, an immediate return to the national currency. 
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2. Why The Euro Crisis? 
Reasons behind the euro crisis have been extensively discussed by the economic profession. The book of the 
EuroThinkTank of Finland reviewed those reasons including the labour market mechanisms and the resulting current account 
problems. Moreover, a lot of attention was devoted to the financial issues, i.e. excess liquidity created in the eurozone. True 
enough, progress was made with integration but cross-border financing contributed to debt bubbles. As banks with distorted 
balance sheets became increasingly dependent on short term borrowing instead of traditional deposits, they also became 
more exposed to disruptions. Most importantly, the debt markets were fuelled by cheap money, for which favourable 
conditions were created by the key central banks, the ECB included. During the euro's lifetime, the financing base of the 
banking sector crumbled and its size relative to the production capacity of the eurozone grew out of proportion. Large banks 
became oversized banks.  
 The book took the view that to understand the creation of excess liquidity, one needs to have a closer look into 
the monetary policy of the ECB. Often, underlying credit expansion is lax monetary policy. The crisis originating in the USA in 
2008 can be traced back to lax monetary policy coupled with failed housing market policy and, in particular, shadow banking 
operations. Also, there were regulatory failures in the supervision of the markets and financial institutions. The ECB's 
monetary policy in the 2000s, the years leading to the euro crisis was lax, too. According to the chart below, the M3 money 
supply was growing in the eurozone by 106% during 2001–2008 while the average annual growth rate should have remained 
at 4.5% according to the first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
CHART 1.  
Growth rate of money supply (M3) and lending by financial institutions in the eurozone  
 
 
Source: ECB 
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In the 1990s, the monetary authorities on both sides of the Atlantics were perhaps thinking that the stance of monetary 
policy with low interest rates is sound enough as the rate of inflation is under control. What this view misses is the fact that the 
rate of inflation was down because of the globalization process based on low-cost production in the developing countries. 
Underlying the easy accumulation of debt was the evolution of the European bond market. Central to these 
developments were the arrangements made by eurobanks and the ECB, which gave added impetus to the growth of debt.  
Several handicaps have been identified in the development of The European Monetary Union. The most fundamental 
one, however, is the political one. The leaders in the euro zone area did not show strict commitment to the jointly designed 
rules of economic policies. The economic relations between the US Federal Government and the states, on the contrary, have 
been since 1840 governed by a strict no-bailout policy. The Fed doesn't hold bonds issued by the states in its portfolio.  
 
 
3. THE WELFARE LOSS OF THE EURO COUNTRIES 
An argument can be put forward that the eurozone would have tumbled into difficulties even without the shock originating in 
the USA. The book provides a statistical assessment of the potential size of the cumulative welfare loss incurred by the euro 
members. It is based on the evolution of the eurozone GDP relative to the recovery of a reference economy, the US. While 
the statistical link in real growth of the GDP between the USA and the EMU was extremely strong up until the end of 2007, it 
has since then broken. The assessment was made using several statistical models based on one-step forecasts. In a sense, 
the cumulative welfare loss measures the distance by which actual GDP has fallen behind the potential GDP. The idea is that 
the USA's GDP serves as a surrogate variable for a larger set of phenomena affecting the GDP in the eurozone.1 
The following models were used2:  
– Stochastic difference equation: the actual evolution of eurozone's GDP was explained by its built-in delay structure and 
the actual evolution of the USA's GDP. 
– VAR model: actual real GDPs of the eurozone and the USA in inter-dependency. 
– VARX model: eurozone's and Finland's GDP were explained by USA's GDP in addition to the built-in delay structures. 
 
The results are summarized as 
 
(i) Using the stochastic difference equation, the difference between the prediction yielded and the actual GDP produced a 
cumulative prediction error of -10.5 in the prediction period after 2007 IV. This shows how much the volume index of 
the eurozone GDP falls short of what was predicted by the model by 2013 III. 
 
CHART 2. STOCHASTIC DIFFERENCE EQUATION: CUMULATIVE PREDICTION ERROR 
 
                                                        
1   The models were estimated using observations from the period 1995 I–2007 IV. All the time series used in the models consisted of seasonally 
adjusted quarterly GDP time series (in levels). After estimation, the models were used to generate a statistical prediction showing how the GDP 
would have been expected to develop if the laws operating prior to the euro crisis had applied during the period 2008 I–2013 III covered by the 
prediction. The predictions were single-step predictions formed by inserting the actual values of the GDP variable to be predicted in the 
estimated model equation in an effort to ensure that the prediction is as sound as possible in terms of its statistical properties. 
2 The models were subjected to diagnostic validation and the adequacy of the model with respect to the remainder term is determined in the 'Hendryan' (Hendry (1959)) spirit of 
statistical deduction.  
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(ii) In the VAR model, the cumulative prediction error yielded by the VAR model was -11.4. 
 
(iii) In the VARX model, the prediction error was -9.8.  
 
The claim that poorer performance in crisis management as compared to the USA is due to the eurozone itself – its 
inherent structural flaws and/or policies – is plausible. This view is supported by several observations: 
(i) Before the USA-induced economic shock, developments in the eurozone followed the economic development of the 
USA quite closely. From 1999–2008, the real rate of growth in both regions was 2.3%.  
(ii) Although the USA succeeded in getting back on the growth track fairly quickly after the 2008–2009 economic crisis, 
the eurozone has failed to do so. 
(iii) The stagnation of the eurozone is not due to other developments in the global economy. No shocks have been sent 
to the eurozone by the world economy that would explain the halt of the region's economic growth. 
Economic history suggests that even a minor difference in growth rate may, with time, lead to a dramatic cumulative 
loss. Chart 3 illustrates the real per-capita growth in GDP from 1860–2004 in Great Britain, the United States, Sweden and 
Finland. A significant observation is made: by the year 1985, the world's wealthiest nation (Great Britain) slips to the last place 
with the lowest income level in this group posting a total per-capita income that is only two-thirds of that of the USA. This 
dramatic cumulative welfare loss is a result of the difference in the average growth rate between the USA and Great Britain – 
a mere 0.4 percentage points per year. The key question in evaluating the crisis facing the monetary union is the effect of the 
new EMU institutions on economic growth and the wellbeing of citizens.  
 
 
CHART 3.  
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Growth rates in Great Britain, USA, Sweden and Finland (1860–2004) in terms of purchasing power parity.  
 
 
 
Source of data: Bolt and Van Zanden (2013) 
 
  
4. THE PLANS FOR AN EXTENDED INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
Germany is emerging as a key player in the long-term evolution of the EU institutions. The body politic in Germany 
wishes to turn the monetary union into a political union. According to German political thinking, supported by all major parties, 
the political union would consist of a banking union, a fiscal union and an economic union.  
Through its current account balance, Germany funds other euro members. The estimated cumulative surplus of the 
current account already exceeds EUR 1,000 billion.3 Germany also benefits from a weak euro relative to the country's 
competitiveness. It has been estimated that if Germany had its own currency, its value against the US dollar could be as high 
as 1.60 whereas the euro-dollar exchange rate now trades around 1.38 (March 2014). 
Is a currency union viable without a political union? There are no examples in world history of successful currency 
unions between independent states.  All successful common currency mechanisms that have been in operation for any longer 
periods of time have been either federal states or confederacies (Bordo and Jonung 1999).  
The IMF has, however, suggested that a full-scale implementation of a banking and fiscal union would save the euro 
and secure stability in the eurozone.4  The ambition to develop the eurozone's economic and monetary union into a fiscal 
                                                        
3 De Macedo and Lempinen (2013). 
 
4 IMF Staff Discussion Note, ”A Banking Union for the Euro Area”, February 2013; IMF Staff Discussion Note, “Toward a Fiscal Union for the Euro Area”, September 2013. 
6 
 
union is expressed in the report 'Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union' published on 5 December 2012. It was 
signed by the President of the European Council; the Chairman of the European Commission; the President of the Eurogroup; 
and the President of the European Central Bank.  
The objective of the road map is to establish a community-level financial policy based on joint liability in order to manage 
economic disruptions. It would be based on increasing community-level decision making. It is foreseen to lead to growing 
coordination of the economic policies of the member states, specifically in taxation and the efforts to address unemployment. 
To strengthen the fiscal capacity of the EMU, plans are in place to introduce a community-level unemployment security 
system to replace equivalent national schemes.  Money to finance the common funding scheme would be raised from national 
sources. Community resources would be strengthened by issuing community-level bonds. The ultimate goal of the fiscal union 
is seen in the creation of the European Ministry of Finance.  
The roadmap for the fiscal union highlights the short-term stabilisation needs of the monetary union. In a federation, it 
would be natural for the community to take care of the stability policy. When responsibility for the monetary policy rests with 
the ECB, evidently the responsibility for financial policy and macro-economic stabilisation would fall on the Commission and 
the European Parliament (or an equivalent agency to be created for the euro countries). A fiscal union would be tasked to 
produce public goods (security, social services) and certain private goods (health care, education), to create a social 
assistance system (unemployment benefits), establish a just income transfer system, and manage the stabilisation policy. 
Fiscal federalism as an economic architecture should be evaluated in terms of whether it increases economic efficiency.  
The book by the EuroThinkTank reviewed such a plan. 
 
5. THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
5.1 Conflicting interests 
The eurozone's growth prospects are so bleak that its welfare losses relative to normal economic development and 
growth may well persist for a long time to come. From the point of view of the future of the monetary union, what is decisive, 
however, is what happens to the large euro members. Italy, Spain and France are facing major problems.  
The economic crisis in the eurozone has also led to divergence of the member states' interests. Southern members 
hold that they are entitled to income transfers from northern members. The former advocate eurobond-based joint liability in 
financing budget deficits, re-distributing the cost of over-indebtedness, managing the potential support measures required by 
eurobanks, and putting in place a joint deposit insurance.  
5.2 The possible futures 
The current state of the eurozone, often referred to as the EMU-2, means a departure from the Maastricht Treaty 
("Maastricht 1"). The principles of 'no bailout' and the non-involvement of the ECB in supporting any individual country have 
ceased to apply.  Most likely, the current situation, EMU-2, is just an intermediary phase. It has become evident that the 
Commission and the ECB will, in accordance with their respective missions, step by step take measures that will willy-nilly 
steer the development of the Union towards deepening integration and centralised decision-making. 
 It appears that the entire eurozone has only two stable options that do not involve any internal tensions 
regarding further development of the system:  
 
(i) A strong federation consisting of the 18 euro members. 
(ii) A return to national currencies, meaning the type of EU membership alike Sweden and Poland. 
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However, each individual country can determine the preferred level of integration for its own part. If this happens, a part of the 
eurozone may evolve into a federation whose currency is used by a group of member states content with a lower level of 
integration. Consequently, the member states have four options:  
  
(i) Membership in a weak euro federation (like today; most likely just a temporary solution). 
(ii) Membership in a strong euro federation (likely outcome of the planned development of the EMU over the long term). 
(iii) Keeping the euro but staying outside of any alliances. 
(iv) Adoption of a national currency or exit from the euro. 
 
5.3 EMU-2 as a weak federation 
Based on EMU-2, the eurozone would evolve into a temporary federation of independent states which would, step by step, be 
strengthened by new decisions. The banking and the fiscal union may just be enough to restore permanent stability to the 
finances of the member states and banks. This time around, the member states might actually stick to the agreements made. 
In case of a new financial crisis, the last resort would again be the ECB's extreme monetary policy measures.5  The capacity 
of the weak federation to generate welfare may be compromised.  
Ample evidence shows that regulators repeatedly fail to prevent banking crises. This creates pressures to introduce 
joint liability sooner or later. Financial policy guidance and control are based on the restrictions imposed by regulators instead 
of continuous and flexible assessment made by the markets, i.e. market discipline. Economic history lends no support to the 
notion that banking crises could be prevented by supervision. Instead, banking crises can only be averted through the 
introduction of the right incentives within the banking system itself.  
 
5.4 A strong federation as the true political union 
There are well-functioning federations in the world such as the USA, Germany and Switzerland.  Invoking the example of 
the USA, one could argue that the main task of a strong federation is to produce public goods (national security, foreign policy 
and a free internal market as a minimum), provide social security for the citizens and assist the member states in the event of 
asymmetric shocks. Characteristic of a strong and successful European federation is that it would work largely in the same 
way as existing federations.6  
The EMU's prospects for becoming a successful federation appear quite bleak, and for a long time to come. The 
applicable criteria could be outlined as follows: 
 
– Sufficient symmetry of the member states' economic performance. 
– Reduced significance of asymmetric shocks. 
– Compatibility of the labour market mechanisms with the monetary union. 
– Adoption of a credible budgetary discipline at the national level. 
– Sufficient similarity in terms of political culture and values. 
– Willingness to relinquish national sovereignty in favour of a federation. 
                                                        
5 In extreme cases, this could mean financing the public debt of the member states thorough the European Central Bank.  
 
6 Of course, the USA's evolution into a federation was a long process. 
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Because of the present-day economic asymmetry between the member states, we are far from achieving a federation based 
on the EMU and turning it into an economic and political success.  
In principle, a strong euro federation can be operationally efficient. Most likely, such a structure may only develop on a 
voluntary basis and, even in the best of cases, over a very long period of time. Until then, the eurozone will – almost by 
definition – operate inefficiently while at the same time probably undermining income generation. For a fairly long time, the 
eurozone would be in the same position as Great Britain was early in the previous century – the rest of the world outgrows it 
before the burden of the past can be shed. 
 
5.5 Return to national currencies 
It is not possible to predict the EMU's performance over the next 10 to 20 years. Despite the current political 
commitments, a disintegration of the EMU cannot be excluded in the light of economic history. 
Nor is it impossible for the monetary union to be dismantled partially: one or several of the crisis-affected countries could 
exit the EMU. The question is whether such an exit is in the best interest of the country involved. For example, Greece cannot 
have any strong incentive to leave the euro for as long as it can expect assistance from other member states. According to 
public sources, Italy, a country with a diversified production sector, considered leaving the euro in 2011.  
Looking at the situation from another standpoint, there may be a natural explanation why the euro politicians have not 
allowed Greece to exit. In the light of economic history, it may be argued that Greece would, in fact, be already on a positive 
growth path if it had pulled out of the EMU and thus allowed its currency to depreciate. The latest case supporting this view is 
the successful recovery of Iceland based on its own currency following an out-and-out collapse of its economy. From this 
perspective, funding to Greece has been continued in order to secure the unity of the eurozone. 
In practice, the return to national currencies could be implemented through a basket currency or individual exits. Nordvig 
(2014) and Miettinen (2011) have proposed a so-called ECU-2 basket (Euro 2.0 redefinition), which would mean backtracking 
the same steps taken when the euro was originally adopted. The euro would be legally defined as a basket currency largely in 
the same way as the ECU was defined before January 1, 1999 at a 1:1 exchange rate relative to the euro. In the basket 
currency, the national currencies would be adopted by each member state side by side with the euro. Initially, they would be 
valued at a 1:1 exchange rate relative to the euro and one another. After that, the rates would be floating and hence, be 
determined by supply and demand. Euro-denominated contracts would continue to be euro-denominated contracts, except that 
now, they would exist in the ECU-2 context. The basket euro could continue to exist forever or, only during a transition period, 
and for as long as any euro-denominated contracts are outstanding. The legal uncertainty could perhaps to a large extent be 
handled by the ECU-2 model. 7 
True, this step would have its own consequences but the disruptions to the financial and banking system would be 
moderate and a far cry from the threat scenarios so frequently espoused.8 The currencies of weak countries would weaken 
and their competitiveness improve while strong countries would experience the opposite. Effectively, debts and receivables 
would remain euro-denominated. 
If a basket currency was adopted, sovereign debt could stay euro-denominated. This would benefit the creditors of weak 
                                                        
7 Nordvig (2) has stressed the importance of legal aspects if the euro is phased out. Governments have the possibility of 
amending the financial agreements governed by their own respective laws. It is essential to know the law by which the 
contracts are governed as well as the jurisdiction in which any disputes are to be settled.  
 
8 We can refer to the calculation (NExit) regarding the Netherlands' exit from the euro mentioned at the beginning of the study. 
The calculation suggests that NExit would have had hardly any repercussions for the financing and banking system. According 
to Nordvig's calculations (2014), the debts and receivables of the Finnish economy are balanced to the extent Finland's exit 
would not have any significant implications for us. Moreover, while nearly all of Finland's sovereign debt is governed by Finnish 
law, no legal ambiguities as to the payment currency would arise. Finnish companies, too, mostly apply Finnish law in their 
euro-denominated commitments.  
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countries as compared to a situation where the receivables were converted to a currency with a lower value. Similarly, and 
importantly for companies, the euros in all euro-denominated currencies would be of equal value irrespective of the governing 
law of the contract. Individual euro members could, within the limits imposed by their legal systems and political realities, 
convert their debt into the new domestic currency, at least in case of contracts made under national law. 
Household debts and existing investments would presumably remain euro-denominated (unless redefined and 
converted into domestic currencies by way of legal amendments) but all future domestic market revenues would be generated 
in national currency. The financial position of households in weak countries would deteriorate and that of households in strong 
countries improve. From the point of view of the economy, the situation would harmonise when exchange rates even out 
differences in competitiveness, even if the short-term adaptation would be painful for some crisis-affected countries. While the 
Deutschmark would appreciate, the national currency of e.g.Greece would depreciate substantially and so would the Italian 
currency, but to a smaller extent.  
 
6. THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR FINLAND? 
In terms of size, Finland is a small member state in the Economic and Monetary Union and its relative weight in the eurozone 
economy and decision-making is modest, just 1.8% according to the ECB capital key. The book by the EuroThinkTank of 
Finland suggested that Finland has three main options to choose from:  
 
– Continued involvement in the evolution of the 18 euro members into a federation. 
– Withdrawal from the federalist evolutionary process and unilateral return to the Maastricht Treaty (Maastricht 2.0) while 
keeping options open as to further steps. 
– An immediate exit from the euro. 
6.1 Finland's Option No. 1: 'Driftwood'  
The 'driftwood' option means participation in the federalist evolution and adaptation to the policies determined largely by the 
large member states. Finland becomes involved in a process whose outcome it cannot really influence. 
Until a strong federation is in place, the eurozone would, at best, exist as a weak federation. This would mean slow and 
confused decision making and the continuation of a vague economic policy. During the evolution towards a strong federation, 
Finland would have to be prepared for sluggish economic growth, on-going income transfers and declining sovereignity. 
An inflexible and non-innovative Finland with a growing level of debt would fit in this type of federation. Finland would not 
have much to lose in a weak-growth federation, in which a sizeable part of the eurozone would be in dire straits economically. 
The only triple-A country would be Germany, which would support the other members financially in exchange for sway and 
influence.  
Acceding to a strong euro federation would be in Finland's best interest if we had a strong and thriving economy and 
wanted to become one of the federal states of Germany. A strong federation would develop democratic decision-making 
institutions and be a major player in the global economy. Its population, approximately 330 million, would be equal in size to 
that of the USA. A strong, mature federation could conceivably appreciate experts from even a small nation. However, because 
of its strong economy, Finland would have to contribute funds to federal use more than the other states on average, which 
would reduce the benefits of membership.  
 
6.2 Finland's Option No. 2: Keeping options open 
As an option, 'slipstreaming' means withdrawing from the federalist evolutionary process and returning unilaterally to the 
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Maastricht Treaty (Maastricht 2.0). This would mean that as the evolutionary process proceeded in small steps, Finland could 
at some point decide that it would not participate in the next step, which would represent a sort of threshold. Any decision to 
withdraw from the federalist process would have to be made by the Finnish Parliament. One benefit offered by this strategy is 
that it would be possible to pull out of the euro unilaterally at a later date. Such withdrawal would not be without political 
consequences; however, it would spare Finnish taxpayers from supporting countries in crisis in the future. More importantly, 
Finland would not be involved in the efforts to manage euro members' debts on a joint liability basis and it would retain its 
sovereignty with regard to economic policy. It is worth bearing in mind that those EU member states (Sweden, Denmark, the 
UK, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech, Romania and Bulgaria) that are not part of the Eurogroup have not participated in 
extending credit to say Greece, either. However, for Finnish banks to be able to do remain in the ECB system, it would be 
necessary, in practice, to agree on the use of the euro and related arrangements.  
The Eurogroup treaties have been, however, drafted in such a way that, for example, any support drawn under the 
ESM is conditional upon each euro member having incorporated the fiscal compact or the balanced budget act in its 
national legislation. Finland included this fiscal law in its legislation as of the beginning of 2013. Presumably, all future 
intergovernmental treaties between euro members will also be combined, making it extremely difficult to stay out of any 
single agreement.  
Withdrawal from integration would lead to political solitude (chosen by Sweden and Denmark) but preserve democracy; 
it would even make it possible to retain the euro if this were felt to be important for trade policy reasons and if the EMU 
authorities agreed to that.  
 
6.3 Finland's Option No. 3: Fixit, return to the Finnish markka 
The third option is a Nordic one – an immediate exit from the euro. An exit from the euro would mean the re-adoption of 
Finland's own currency. Nordvig (2014) has calculated that Finland's financial receivables, investments and debts in the 
eurozone would not result in any significant financial gains or losses. Of course, the effects would depend on how markets 
would value the new currency. Based on the data available at the end of 2013, Nordvig estimates that the independent 
markka would be 7% weaker than the euro. Until the last few years, Finland's current accounts have shown a surplus, and so 
it would hardly be necessary for Finland to regulate the movement of capital. Nor would any significant systemic impacts on 
capital, credit or derivative markets be anticipated. 
 
 
7.4 What options could Finland consider? 
According to the book by EuroThinkTank, Finland will survive in any currency system as long as its economy is sound. Can 
one then trust Finland's ability to sustain a healthy economy and balanced public finances? It may be doubted on valid 
grounds. The political system is disintegrated. The labour market is dominated by strong unions and the tripartite bargaining 
system is conservative, effectively blocking necessary structural reforms. 
If Finland were unwilling or unable to look after the economy well, should she strive to live off the European federation as 
a silent partner or sink into poverty amidst other counties with a currency of their own? If her decision-makers were unable to 
pursue a sound economic policy beneficial to the country, should she stay as part of the eurozone in the hope of receiving 
income transfers? Or should she instead seek to remain outside the euro union in order to allow the floating markka to take 
care of the necessary adjustments?  
If she, by contrast, were able to manage the economy well, would it make sense for her to join a joint liability system as 
a net payer? If she stays in the euro, the pressures to amend the labour market system would mount. The weaker the Finnish 
economy is, the harder these pressures would be. 
At present, the EMU countries account only for a little over 30% of Finland's exports. Contrary to all expectations, this 
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share has fallen since the adoption of the euro. In 2000, nearly 34% of Finland's exports went to the eurozone whereas the 
corresponding figure in 2011 was only 31%. Important export markets for Finland are Sweden, the USA, Russia and the UK, 
none of which is an EMU country.9 
 
CHART 4.  FINLAND'S EXPORTS BY GROUP OF COUNTRY 
 
 
Sweden's position with its own currency and labour market solutions is better than those of Finland. Moreover, Sweden 
had carried out most of the necessary political reforms already after the 1990s depression. Consequently, Finland would be in 
a tougher situation than Sweden even if she had her own currency. Even so, a national currency would serve Finland's 
purpose better than the euro. Finland would have an exchange rate it deserves.  
Ultimately, Finland's relationship with the monetary union should be determined by the will of the people. Does she want 
to be part of a superpower or does she want to preserve the right of self-determination? Before making the choice, Finland 
needs to decide what she wants and what she is striving for. Making the choice is inevitable. 
 
                                                        
9 The fact calls for an explanation why Finnish industry is such a keen supporter of the euro. One explanation could be that if 
Finland stays in the EMU, a labour reform and further flexibilities in the labour market become necessary. Yet, flagging out of 
the Finnish industry has intensified since the introduction of the euro. Another point worth noting is that Finland's accession to 
the euro was strongly advocated by the trade unions. 
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